

# The Platform Design Problem

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## Problem


Model the revenue-maximization problem of modern online firms (e.g. Google, FB, etc.) and understand computational tractability.

### Bi-Level MDP Optimization Model


**Agent:** participates in Life MDP

**Designer:** tweaks the Life MDP by building platforms.

**Goal:** **Designer** wants to indirectly optimize its reward via **Agent's** optimal behavior! (Find Stackelberg)



Life MDP



Tweaked MDP via  $y_i$

## Main Question:

Computational tractability of Stackelberg Equilibrium for the **Designer-Agent** game?

## Main Results (informal)

1. General (unstructured) design problem is NP-hard.
2. Flower (diagram) design problem has a DP FPTAS, and is NP-complete.
3. Results generalize when other **Designers** have already built platforms, and to settings with small #s of **Agent** types.

## Future Work

Follow-up questions:

1. Designer vs. Designer games
2. Privacy/Ethics/Fairness questions for Agent welfare
3. Learning settings and Strategic behavior
4. and many more...