The Platform Design Problem
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Problem
Model the revenue-maximization problem of modern online firms (e.g. Google, FB, etc.) and understand computational tractability.

Bi-Level MDP Optimization Model
Agent: participates in Life MDP
Designer: tweaks the Life MDP by building platforms.
Goal: Designer wants to indirectly optimize its reward via Agent’s optimal behavior! (Find Stackelberg)

Main Question:
Computational tractability of Stackelberg Equilibrium for the Designer-Agent game?

Main Results (informal)
1. General (unstructured) design problem is NP-hard.
2. Flower (diagram) design problem has a DP FPTAS, and is NP-complete.
3. Results generalize when other Designers have already built platforms, and to settings with small #s of Agent types.

Future Work
Follow-up questions:
1. Designer vs. Designer games
2. Privacy/Ethics/Fairness questions for Agent welfare
3. Learning settings and Strategic behavior
4. and many more…